A review of the empirical literature on the cross-country effects of capital account liberalization on growth generally supports Bhagwati's claim. 4 There are a number of reasons one might expect it to be difficult to find a significant effect of open capital markets on economic growth. Prominent among them is the fact that the contributions of open capital markets to allocative efficiency depend upon the existence of a web of other factors in an economy as well, including appropriate institutions and a well-regulated and well-supervised financial sector. Rodrik (1999) emphasizes this, writing "Openness to international capital flows can be especially dangerous if the appropriate controls, regulatory apparatus and macroeconomic frameworks are not in place." (p. 30). 5 Thus, countries that systematically benefit from capital inflows will have in place the institutions, regulatory policies and supervisory agencies required to mitigate financial market failures. But, of course, these institutions and frameworks are not evenly spread across the globe. Those countries that are most in need of external funding are likely to 4 See the survey of the literature on capital account openness and growth by Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (2003) . 5 Kraay (1998) finds no evidence that the benefits of capital account liberalization are only realized in countries with sound institutions and policies.
be the very ones that are most lacking in the infrastructure required to make good use of these funds.
At the other end of the spectrum, capital account liberalization may not be an important policy innovation for rich countries. Many of these countries are relatively well-diversified in domestic industries, as compared to emerging market countries, and, therefore, have less to gain than poorer countries from an increase in global risk-sharing. 6 In a similar vein, rich countries may see little change in their access to cutting-edge technology, the depth of their financial markets or the degree to which they enjoy good governance, the so-called indirect consequences of open capital markets, in the wake of capital account liberalization. 7 Finally, richer countries may face fewer binding constraints than poorer countries if domestic savings are the primary means for funding domestic investment (with some obvious exceptions, like the development of Norway's capacity to extract North Sea oil in the 1970s). Perhaps for these reasons, Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) report, in their words, "scant evidence" of an effect of capital account liberalization on growth for these countries.
These arguments suggest that the most promising prospects for finding a significant effect of capital account liberalization on growth may be amongst middleincome countries. To investigate this, we need to allow for the response of growth to capital account openness to vary across countries in a systematic way. In this paper we present evidence that there is, in fact, an inverted-U shaped relationship between the 6 Obstfeld (1994) estimates the returns from international financial integration, measured as the change in the present value of consumption as a percentage of wealth, to be about four times greater for African countries than for North American or northern European countries. 7 Jeanne and Gourinchas (2002) emphasize the importance of the indirect effects of capital account liberalization for explaining cross-country differences in income per capita. effect of capital account openness on growth and income per capita. The estimates presented here suggest that middle-income countries benefit significantly from capital account openness, but these effects are not statistically significant for rich countries or for poor countries and, for the latter, the estimated effect may even be negative and significant. This result is robust to the use of different indicators of capital account openness as well as the inclusion of a variety of indicators of government quality and reputation. A similar inverted-U shaped relationship is found when we allow the effect of capital account openness on growth to vary with various indicators of government quality, indicators that are themselves highly correlated with income per capita. Thus, in response to the question "Who needs capital account convertibility?" posed by Rodrik in the title of his 1998 paper, one answer provided in this paper is those countries that, in 1976, had income per capita between that of Mexico and Israel.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the econometric specification used in the paper and compares this with the specification used previously in the literature. This section also includes a discussion of the two indicators of capital account openness used in this paper. Section III presents results for the specification in which capital account openness is interacted with income per capita.
Section IV offers a similar set of results that demonstrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness and various measures of government quality. Concluding comments are offered in Section V.
II. Estimating the Effect of Capital Account Openness on Growth
The policy debate over the consequences of open capital accounts has spurred a research literature that attempts to estimate whether, in fact, economic growth is enhanced when a country allows its residents to borrow and lend internationally. The majority of this research augments standard growth regressions with indicators of capital account openness described in Section II.a below. The relevant test, therefore, is whether there is a positive and significant coefficient on the capital account openness indicator.
While some studies, such as Quinn (1997) , present evidence that open capital accounts promote growth, other work, including Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , fails to uncover a significant effect. Furthermore, Rodrik (1998) shows that the significance attributed to capital account openness in a cross-country growth regression disappears with the inclusion of an indicator of government reputation, a variable whose coefficient is significant in the growth regression.
A more general specification allows for the possibility that the effect of capital account openness on growth varies with the level of income. Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) investigate this by including, in a standard cross-country growth regression, an indicator of capital account openness and the product of this indicator and the logarithm of GDP per capita. They find that the effect of capital account openness on growth declines with the level of income and, as mentioned above, scant evidence of an effect for richer countries. But this linear relationship between the overall coefficient of capital account openness and income is too restrictive in that it does not allow for a distinction between the very poorest countries and those with intermediate levels of income.
A more flexible quadratic relationship between the effect of capital account openness on growth and income per capita does allow for differences among poor countries, middle-income countries, and rich countries, while nesting the Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) specification. In this paper, the first set of crosscountry growth regressions presented in Section III are based on the specification
ΔlnY 1976-1995,i 
where ΔlnY 1976-1995,i where t 0.025 is the appropriate t statistic, s is the estimated standard deviation of the regression, X is the n x 10 matrix of regressors in which the last three columns include the variables K i , (K i x lnY 1976,i ), and (K i x lnY 1976,i 2 ), respectively, and w is a 10 element vector that that takes the form w′ = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 lnY 1976,i (lnY 1976,i ) 2 ].
9 The 1997 issue of Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions expanded the summary information on capital controls including, for the first time, a distinction between restrictions on including Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , Kraay (1998) , Rodrik (1998) There are 53 countries in our data set for which we have both a value for this indicator of capital account openness, which we denote as KQuinn, as well as other variables used as regressors. 11 Quinn also scores the intensity of controls for four categories related to current account restrictions and a category he calls international legal agreements, yielding an overall openness measure that potentially ranges from 0 to 14.
12 For a more complete discussion of these two indicators if capital account openness, as well as a comparison of them, see Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (2002 Despite their differences, Share [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] and KQuinn offer a similar view of the extent and cross-country differences in capital account openness, with the correlation between these two variables equal to 0.73 for the 51 countries for which both variables are available. Furthermore, we will see that the results presented in the next two sections exhibit very similar patterns of significance using either of these two indicators of capital account openness and the quantitative estimates using either of these two measures are broadly similar.
III. Capital Account Openness, Income and Growth
Our first results that show the varieties of experience across countries with respect to the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness are presented in Table 1 ), a somewhat smaller range than that found when using 
III.a Robustness
There are two possible concerns with the results discussed above. One is that the indicators of capital account openness may themselves be functions of the level of growth of an economy. We address this by presenting results using instrumental variable estimation in Table 1 . Another concern regards whether capital account openness is only serving as a proxy for government quality. This criticism, first raised by Rodrik (1998) with respect to a growth regression augmented with Share 76-95 , has been shown by The instrumental variables results are broadly consistent with those estimated using OLS. In particular, the IV estimates, like the OLS estimates, suggest that there is not a significant effect of capital account openness for economic growth for the poorest countries or for the richest countries. But both sets of IV estimates suggest that there is a significant effect for middle income The results presented in Table 2 address the concern that capital account openness is only serving as a proxy for the quality of a country's government. , Population Growth, and Africa) as well as the three indicators of government quality.
The results presented in Table 2 are roughly comparable to those presented in Table 2 show that 15 percent of the countries have a significant effect, as compared to 28 percent when these three variables are not included in the regression. Nevertheless, the results in Table 2 are consistent with those in Table   1 , namely that significant and positive effects of capital account openness on growth can be detected among middle income countries, but not among poor or rich countries. 16 As discussed above, Rodrik finds that the inclusion of a measure of Government Reputation adversely affects the significance of the effect of capital account liberalization on growth. The Government Reputation variable, however, is only available for a subset of countries used in the regressions that employ Share [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] . Therefore we use these other three measures to preserve degrees of freedom. The correlations of each of these measures with Government Reputation are about 0.83.
IV. Capital Account Openness, Government Quality, and Growth
One interpretation of the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 , and depicted in Figures 1 and 2 , is that poor countries do not have in place the regulatory and political infrastructure needed to translate capital inflows into productive resources for an economy. This interpretation is based on the assumption that this infrastructure is correlated with income per capita.
We investigate this assumption using our indicators of Rule of Law, Government
Efficiency and Control of Corruption. Table 3 A natural follow-up to specification (1), therefore, is to run three sets of regressions, each of which takes the form
where G i is either Rule of Law, Government Efficiency or Control of Corruption for country i, and Z* i an n x 8 matrix (n = 78 to 84 for regressions using Share [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] and n = 53 for regressions using KQuinn) that includes both the regressors in Z i described above and G i . This specification is somewhat less compelling than (1) because income per capita is correlated with a range of aspects of government quality and each of the three versions of (4) includes only one measure of government quality. Nevertheless, considering regressions of the type specified in (4) for different indicators of government quality provides a good robustness test of the results presented in Table 1 . 
Figures 3 through 8, corresponding to the results in Columns 1 through 6 of Table 4 , respectively, present depictions of T i for all values of G i in the relevant range.
The results presented in Table 4 Table 1 .
V. Conclusion
This paper offers robust empirical evidence that capital account openness contributes in an important way to economic growth for middle-income countries. The results presented in this paper answer, to some extent, the concern voiced by Bhagwati and others that the beneficial effects of capital account liberalization have been asserted rather than demonstrated.
But a more nuanced view, one that growth among poorer countries may not be promoted by capital account liberalization, is also consistent with the results presented in this paper. The advantage of the method undertaken in this paper is that it allows for differences across countries in the response of growth to open capital accounts depending upon the level of income or the quality of government. Thus, this enables us to address arguments implicit in the views presented in the introduction, including the IMF (2000) report that recognizes a "need to carefully manage and sequence liberalization," the claim by Rogoff (2002) that there is widespread agreement for an "eclectic approach to capital account liberalization" and the concerns voiced by Rodrik (1999) about the need for "appropriate controls, regulatory apparatus and macroeconomic frameworks" in order for a country to enjoy the benefits of capital account liberalization. The results presented here offer evidence that, in fact, capital account openness can be a tonic but, like all treatments, its potential for success cannot be separated from the context in which it is administered. 
